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 Child Pornography and Child Molestation: 
One and the Same or Completely Separate Crimes? 
I. 
Introduction 
Fifteen years ago, in developing the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 
Congress found that, "child pornography is often used by pedophiles and child sexual 
abusers to stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites."1 The acts of possession of 
child pornography and child molestation are seemingly distinct crimes; however, recent 
studies have highlighted the adjunctive nature of the underlying behavior of both crimes.2 
Three recent Circuit Court of Appeals decisions have created a division that is 
inconsistent with these studies.3 
These three court of appeals decisions affect the federal circuits by blurring the 
threshold used to determine when probable cause is established.4 The Eighth Circuit held 
in United States v. Colbert that a magistrate judge reasonably approved a search of 
defendant' s home in order to locate child pornography when there was evidence the 
defendant attempted to entice a young girl.5 The court found that probable cause existed 
because "individuals sexually interested in children frequently utilize child pornography 
to reduce the inhibitions of their victims.,6 Contrary to the decision in Colbert, the Sixth 
Circuit found in United States v. Hodson that approval of a search warrant was not 
justified and therefore, the search for child pornography was not supported by probable 
1 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 (1996). 
2 See Michael L. Bourke, Andres E. Hernandez, The 'Butner Study ' Redux: A Report of the Incidence of 
Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 J. Fam. Violence 183 (2009). 
3 See United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1469, 179 L.Ed. 2d 312 
(U.S. 2011); United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
4Jd. 
5 Colbert, 605 F.3d at 577 (8th Cir. 2010). 
6Jd 
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cause. 
7 The affidavit used in Hodson was based on defendant's online confession to an 
undercover officer that he had an attraction to children and that he had sexually molested 
a seven-year-old boy. 8 Similarly, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Falso that a 
search for child pornography was not supported by probable cause where the affidavit 
was based in part on evidence that defendant had previously been arrested for sexually 
abusing a minor.9 
These cases illustrate an important issue: the absence of a bright line rule to 
determine when evidence of child molestation can be used to support probable cause to 
search a defendant's home for child pornography. While the totality of the circumstances 
could, in some instances, allow a magistrate judge to find probable cause, there are many 
other instances where probable cause might not be found. 10 The inherent dangerous 
nature of these two crimes present a compelling dilemma in those events where probable 
cause cannot be established to directly link these two crimes. On the other hand, by 
adopting a bright line rule to link the crimes of child molestation and child pornography, 
the Court gives in to their precedential reluctance of interfering in "private" spheres. 
Grappling with and reconciling these two conflicting issues defines the underlying theme 
of this Comment. 
Two increasingly problematic issues for law enforcement are the growing 
technology of the Internet and the ever-increasing ways that child pornographers can hide 
7 Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292. 
8 ld at 287-88. 
9 Falso, 544 F.3d at 124 (2d Cir. 2008). 
1° Compare United States v. Adkins, 169 F. App'x 961 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[s]tanding alone, a high incidence 
of child molestation by persons convicted of child pornography crimes may not demonstrate that a child 
molester is likely to possess child pornography.") with United States v. Haynes, 160 F. App'x 940 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (Officers' belief that probable cause of child molestation supported a search for child 
pornography was objectively reasonable, based on no more than "common sense."). 
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images.11 Traditional investigative techniques are no longer useful to prevent the 
victimization of innocent children. Additionally, child pornographers do not fit neatly 
into any existing, traditional Fourth Amendment category. Consequently, the best 
response the judiciary has been able to muster to combat the societal danger of child 
pornography has been to engage in a balancing test. However, as evidenced by the 
current circuit split, an unguided judicial balancing test is too subjective to serve as a 
reliable decision-making formula. To determine whether probable cause exists to support 
a search for child pornography, courts, law enforcement, and society as a whole need a 
more lucid standard. 
Therefore, the proposed solution is to emulate the broadened probable cause 
standard used in obtaining search warrants relating to drug crimes. 12 In certain cases, 
courts have expanded the probable cause standard and considered the background and 
training of the affiant, the severity of the crime, readily available, reliable statistics, and a 
development of the nexus between the crimes and the particular place to be searched. If 
law enforcement officers are able to use certain evidence of crimes dealing with the 
sexual exploitation of children as a way to infer the necessity of a search for child 
pornography, then every member of society may be subject to a search on exactly the 
same grounds. This broadened standard will serve as a concrete guidepost for the 
judiciary, law enforcement personnel, and society in general. Such a standard has the 
potential to be used as prima facie evidence that a questionable search is reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
11 National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, Child Molesters: A Behavioral Analysis, Lanning, 
Kenneth V. (5th Ed. 201 0), available at http://www.missingkids.com/en US/publications/NC70.pd[ (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
12 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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This comment will proceed in three parts. Part II will begin by detailing the 
history of the growth of child pornography and sexual abuse of children. This section 
will also discuss the historical development of child pornography laws, as well as the 
historical progression of the Fourth Amendment. Part III will provide a discussion of the 
current debate on the correlation between child pornography and child molestation and 
how this problem affects the federal circuit courts. By focusing on an in depth analysis 
of recent circuit court cases, this Comment will specifically target issues in developing 
probable cause to search for child pornography. 
Part IV identifies a potential solution to this problem: child pornography is a form 
of child abuse and as such, a different, more expansive probable cause standard should be 
developed. By building on Parts II and III, this section will suggest a new, expanded 
approach to determining probable cause in situations involving evidence of child 
exploitation. Part IV will also examine the practical ramifications of implementing the 
proposed broadened probable cause standard. This section will argue that by mildly 
conflating child exploitation crimes, it will alleviate confusion and inconsistencies 
regarding the process of determining probable cause. 
II. 
Background 
A. History of Pornography in General 
The first, full-length, English language pornographic novel, "Memoirs of a 
Woman of Pleasure," also known as "Fanny Hill," was published in 1748.13 Despite the 
reticent public attitudes toward sex at that time, pornographic novels left little to the 
13 The History of Pornography No More Prudish Than the Present, available at 
http://www .foxnews.com/health/20 1 0/1 0/13/history-pornography-prudish-present/. 
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imagination.14 The author of ""Fanny Hill" managed to cover bisexuality, voyeurism, 
group sex, and masochism, among other topics. 15 With the advent of photography in 
1839, pornographers were exposed to unparalleled innovation in the pornography genre. 16 
Video followed a similar groundbreaking path. 17 By 1896, filmmakers in France were 
exploring pornography with short, silent clips like HLe Coucher de la Marie," in which 
an actress performed a strip tease.18 
The cultural and sexual revolution of the 1960's and 1970's led to changing social 
mores, which opened the door for public showing of explicit films. 19 The subsequent 
development of the Internet and the invention of the digital camera lowered the barriers 
to making, viewing and distributing pornography.20 Today, while pornography continues 
to inundate the Internet, the actual size of the industry remains a mystery.21 
B. Setting the Stage for Conflict: Efforts to Criminalize Child Pornography 
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court, faced with competing interests, ruled 
that obscene material was not protected under the First Amendment's guarantee of 
Freedom of Speech.22 In Miller v. California, the Court acknowledged the "'inherent 
dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression," and said, "'state statutes 
designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited."23 In an attempt to set 
such limits, the Court defined obscene material as that which, when taken as a whole, 
14ld 
15ld 
16ld 
17Jd 
18Jd 
19 The History of Pornography No More Prudish Than the Present, available at 
http://www .foxnews.com/health/20 1 011 011 3/history-pornography-prudish-present/. 
20 Jd 
21 ld. 
22 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973). 
23 Jd at 23-24. 
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appeals to the prurient interest, is patently offensive in light of community standards, and 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value?4 
Congress's first step toward protecting children from child pornography occurred 
with the passage of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 ?5 
This legislation prohibited the use of children under the age of sixteen in making sexually 
explicit material to be distributed in interstate commerce?6 However, this bill only 
regulated the commercial sale of child pornography, not the trading of such material. 27 
Five years later, the Court in New York v. Ferber held that the distribution and 
sale of even non-obscene child pornography could be criminalized?8 The Court found 
that child pornography could be banned without first being deemed "obscene" under 
Miller for five reasons: (1) The government has a very compelling interest in preventing 
the sexual exploitation of children; (2) distribution of visual depictions of children 
engaged in sexual activity is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children;29 (3) 
advertising and selling child pornography provides an economic motive for producing 
child pornography; ( 4) visual depictions of children engaged in sexual activity have 
negligible artistic value; and (5) recognizing and classifying child pornography as a 
category of material outside the protection of the First Amendment is not incompatible 
with the Court's earlier decisions.30 
24 Jd at 24. 
25 Pub. L. No. 95-225,92 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423,2251-53 (1994 & Supp. IV 
1998)). 
26ld 
27 Amy E. Wells, Comment, Criminal Procedure: The Fourth Amendment Collides with the Problem of 
Child Pornography and the Internet, 53 Okla. L. Rev. 99, 102 (2000). 
28 New Yorkv. Ferber, 458.U.S. 747,756 (1982). 
29 The images serve as a permanent reminder of the abuse, and it is necessary for government to regulate 
the channels of distributing such images if it is to be able to eliminate the production of child pornography. 
30 Jd at 756-64. 
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In 1984 Congress passed the Child Protection Act/1 which went a step further, 
eliminating the need for a commercial transaction and raising the statutory age of a minor 
to eighteen.32 Finally, in 1988, the first law concerned with the nexus between computers 
and child pornography was passed. 33 The Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement 
Act prohibited the use of computers to distribute child pornography. 34 
In Osborne v. Ohio, the Supreme Court extended it's holding in Ferber and 
upheld state criminal sanctions for the private possession of child pornography. 35 By 
outlawing the possession of child pornography, the government sought to eradicate 
legitimate harms by diminishing the market for child pornography. 36 With the advent of 
the Internet and increasing technologies, the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 199637 
("CPP A") was developed to restrict child pornography on the Internet, including virtual 
child pornography.38 In the words of one court, "[t]he regulation ... shifted from 
defining child pornography in terms of the harm inflicted upon real children to a 
determination that child pornography was evil in and of itself, whether it involved real 
children or not."39 
However, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court considered whether the 
CPPA's provisions regarding virtual pornography abridged the constitutional guar~tees 
31 Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified as amended at 18 U .S.C. §§ 
2251-53 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). 
32 Wade T. Anderson, Criminalizing "Virtual" Child Pornography Under the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act: Is It Really What It "Appears to Be?" 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 393, 396 (2001). 
33 Id 
34 Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4485 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251A-2252 (1994 & Supp. 
IV 1998)). 
35 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1697, 109 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1990). 
36 Id at 103. 
37 Child Pornography PreventionAct of1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(1), 110 Stat. 3009-26 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note (Supp. N 1998). 
38 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. V 1999). 
39 Sarah Sternberg, The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 and the First Amendment: Virtual 
Antithesis, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2783 (2001) (citing Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1089 
(9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001). 
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of the First Amendment.40 While the Court recognized that Congress was free to pass 
valid laws to protect children from abuse,41 they also noted that it was well established 
that speech may not be prohibited because it concerns subjects offending our 
sensibilities.42 The CPPA statute at issue included provisions that covered materials 
beyond the categories recognized in Ferber and Miller.43 Thus, the Court held that the 
prohibitions of CPPA §§ 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) were overbroad and 
unconstitutional. 44 
More recently, in a 2011 Washington University Law Review Article, Carissa 
Byrne Hessick notes that the legislative and judicial responses to the modem increase in 
child pornography have been uniformly draconian.45 State and federal governments have 
drastically increased the criminal penalties for crimes involving child pornography. 46 
The underlying dialogue adjoining the push for increased sentences suggests an 
assumption that those who possess child pornography are indistinguishable from those 
who actually abuse children.47 This rhetoric takes several forms: 
Some argue that penalties for possession of child 
pornography should be increased because it is a crime that 
is equivalent to, or worse than, the act of sexually abusing a 
child. Others contend that possession of child pornography 
40Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1396, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2002). 
41 E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241,2251. 
42 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 245 (see also Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874, 117 S. 
Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) ("In evaluating the free speech right of adults, we have made it perfectly 
clear that '[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment."') 
43 Jd 535 U.S. at 256. 
44 ld at 258 (The CPPA expands the federal prohibition on child pornography to include not only 
pornographic images made using actual children, 18 U,S.C. §2256(8)(A), but also ''any visual depiction, 
including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer generated image or picture" that 
"is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," §2256(8)(B), and any sexually 
explicit image that is "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that 
conveys the impression" it depicts "a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," §2256(8)(D)). 
45 Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 Wash. U.L. Rev. 
853, 855 (2011). 
46ld 
47 ld 
8 
Katie Rigler 
must be punished severely because possession creates an 
increased risk that an individual will sexually abuse 
children. And still others seem to treat prosecutions for 
possession of child pornography as a proxy for prosecuting 
those who sexually abuse children; in other words, because 
those who possess child pornography are assumed also to 
sexually abuse children, the punishment for child 
pornography possession ought to be calibrated to punish 
child sex abuse as opposed to merely possession of child 
pornography .48 
The common thread throughout this underlying dialogue is that regardless how these two 
separate crimes are punished, they are highly intertwined because of the inherently 
dangerous risk they both present to innocent children. 
Finally, the ever-changing ways that new technologies operate create new and 
harder to detect opportunities for possessors of child pornography to avoid apprehension. 
Law enforcement personnel and potential child pornography possessors face a highly 
problematic issue when this form of secrecy intersects with the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. This issue can be resolved by mildly conflating the crimes of 
child sexual abuse and child pornography. By doing so, the ability to establish probable 
cause is slightly expanded without infringing on an individual's Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
C. Evolution of the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a citizen from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.49 It reads: 
48ld 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
49 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
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affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 50 
The United States has seen a major evolution of the Fourth Amendment and, more 
specifically, the probable cause standard over the course of the past century. Beginning 
in 1933, the Court announced, "mere affirmance ofbeliefor suspicion is not enough" to 
support probable cause to obtain a warrant to search a private dwelling. 51 The Court 
required more in order to protect the individual from potentially zealous law enforcement 
agents entering a home without probable cause. 52 The point of the Fourth Amendment is 
not to deny law enforcement the support of usual inferences that reasonable men might 
draw from evidence. 53 Instead, the protection requires that those inferences be drawn by 
a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being drawn by the officer engaged in the 
often-competitive enterprise of ferretting out crime. 54 
With regard to the responsibilities of the neutral and detached magistrate, the 
Court in fllinois v. Gates stated that, "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to 
make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in 
the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place."55 The Court's precedent has established that 
probable cause is not a standard formally set in stone. Instead, probable cause is a fluid 
concept that focuses on "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on 
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act."56 The fact that the 
probable cause standard is such a fluid and nebulous concept can lead to a multitude of 
50 ld. 
51 Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47, 54 S.Ct. 11, 13, 78 L.Ed. 159 (1933). 
52 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13~14, 68 S.Ct. 367,369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). 
53 ld. 
54ld 
55 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,214, 103 S.Ct. 2317,2320,76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). 
56 ld at 231. 
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problems in trying to obtain a search warrant. Inconsistency and uncertainty abound 
when a law enforcement agent can submit an affidavit to one magistrate and obtain a 
search warrant, yet be denied a search warrant by a different magistrate evaluating the 
same affidavit. 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Intersection of Child Molestation and Child Pornography 
A scholarly and legal debate exists as to whether there is simply a correlation 
between child molestation and child pornography or whether there is actual causation 
between these two crimes. This Comment seeks to determine whether this debate really 
matters. Even without evidence to support causation, if these two crimes are so highly 
correlated that they are almost one and the same, should not evidence of one support 
probable cause to locate evidence of the other? In response to a 2009 American Bar 
Association article written by Mark Hansen about the sentencing laws for child 
pornography offenders, the Department of Justice suggested that, "setting aside whether 
there is a causal connection or even a correlation between child pornography and child 
molestation, those who collect child pornography exploit and victimize the children in 
those images, and create a demand for the production of more child pornography, 
regardless of whether they have ever personally molested a child."57 
A study done by Michael L. Bourke of the United States Marshals Service and 
Andres E. Hernandez of the Federal Correction Institution located in Butner, North 
57 Alexandra Gelber, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Response to "A Reluctant Rebellion" 8-9 (2009), available at 
http://www .usdoj.gov/criminal/ceos/ReluctantRebellionResponse.pdf; Mark Hansen, American Bar 
Association Journal, A Reluctant Rebellion, Laws are tough on child pornography. But some federal 
judges think the time isn't fitting the crime, (2000), available at 
http://www .abajoumal.com/magazine/article/a reluctant rebellion/. 
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Carolina, gathered further empirical evidence of the debate over the link between these 
two categories of crime. 58 The study compared two groups of child pornography 
offenders who were participating in a voluntary treatment program: men whose known 
sexual offense history at the time of sentencing involved child pornography, but did not 
include any "hands-on" sexual abuse, and men convicted of similar child pornography 
offenses, but who had documented histories of hands-on sexual offenses against at least 
one child victim. 59 The goal was to determine whether the former group's offenders were 
"merely" collectors of child pornography at little risk for engaging in hands-on sexual 
offenses, or if they were contact sex offenders whose criminal sexual behavior involving 
children, with the exception of Internet crimes, went undetected. 60 
The findings of the study showed that the Internet offenders in the sample were 
significantly more likely than not to have sexually abused a child via a hands-on act. 61 
This study also reported a 2,3 69% increase in the number of contact sexual offenses 
acknowledged by the treatment participants from the time of their Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report to the time of the study.62 As the authors stated: 
This dramatic increase . . . challenges the often-repeated 
assertion that child pornography offenders are 'only' 
involved with 'pictures.' It appears that these offenders are 
far from being innocent, sexually 'curious' men who, 
through naivete or dumb luck, became entangled in the 
World Wide Web. [L]ess than 2% of subjects who entered 
treatment without known hands-on offenses were verified 
to be 'just pictures' cases.63 
58 Michael L. Bourke, Andres E. Hernandez, The 'Butner Study' Redux: A Report of the Incidence of 
Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 J. Fam. Violence 183 (2009), available 
at http:/ /bcsdcvbercrimes.com!Documents/Hernandez%20Studv. pdf. 
59 Jdat183. 
60 ld. 
6lld 
62 ld at 188. 
63 ld 
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The Butner Study calls into question whether it is pragmatically and theoretically 
useful to discriminate between child pornographers and child abusers. 64 The authors of 
the study believe that a complex and reciprocal interaction between the two crimes 
exists. 65 Likewise, the results of the study suggest that our society may be faced with a 
new category of offending; that is, that many Internet child pornography offenders may 
be undetected child molesters and that their use of child pornography is indicative of their 
paraphilic orientation. 66 
B. How This Problem Affects the Federal Circuits 
The leading cases that attempt to answer the question of whether evidence of 
child molestation can be used to support probable cause to obtain a search warrant to 
locate child pornography have wholly different factual bases. 67 But, the difficult 
balancing act between the protection of innocent minors and the privacy of the individual 
is the common theme throughout all of the cases heard by the circuit courts. 68 
1. United States v. Colbert- Eighth Circuit 
In United States v. Colbert69, which was denied certiorari by the Supreme Court 
in February 2011, detectives of the Davenport, Iowa police department drove to 
Vandeveer Park to investigate a complaint of suspicious activity related to a young girl.70 
The detectives spoke to the child's uncle who had become concerned after observing a 
man interacting with his five year old niece, pushing her on a swing, and talking to her 
64 Michael L. Bourke, Andres E. Hernandez, The 'Butner Study' Redux: A Report of the Incidence of 
Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 J. Fam. Violence 183, 188 (2009), 
available at http:/ /bcsdcy bercrimes.com/Docum ents/Hernandez%20Study. pdf. 
65 Jd at 189. 
66 ld at 190. 
67 See supra note 3. 
68ld. 
69 United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1469, 179 L.Ed. 2d 312 
(U.S. 2011). 
70 ld at 575. 
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about movies and videotapes he had at his home.71 The police obtained a description of 
what was later determined to be the defendant Donald Gene Colbert's vehicle.72 While 
the detectives were still at the park, two patrol officers identified the vehicle and stopped 
Colbert.73 He consented to a search of his car and agreed to speak with the detectives.74 
Inside the car, the detectives found a police scanner, handcuffs, and a hat bearing the 
phrase "New York PD."75 Colbert told the officers that he had the handcuffs because he 
had been employed as a security guard four years earlier?6 He then admitted to speaking 
to the young girl at the park about movies that he had at his apartment. 77 
The detectives relayed this information to another detective who drafted a warrant 
application seeking permission to search Colbert's residence for books, photos, videos, 
and other electronic media depicting "minors engaged in a prohibited sexual act or in the 
simulation of a prohibited sexual act."78 All of the facts relating to the incident in the 
park, as well as the detectives' interaction with the defendant, were summarized in the 
warrant application.79 An Iowa District Court judge issued a search warrant for Colbert's 
apartment.80 The subsequent search resulted in the discovery of a number of children's 
movies, a computer, and numerous CD's containing child pomography.81 Colbert 
appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. 82 As stated in the case, the 
issue the court attempted to answer was whether the facts set forth in the affidavit, 
?lid. 
72 Jd. 
73 Jd. 
74Jd. 
75 Colbert, 605 F.3d at 575. 
76 Jd. 
77 Jd. 
78 Jd. 
79 ld. 
80 ld. at 576. 
81 Colbert, 605 F.3d at 576. 
82 ld. 
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detailing evidence of enticement of a minor, establish a link supporting probable cause to 
search a defendant's home to locate child pornography.83 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa concluded that 
the information regarding enticement established probable cause to search defendant's 
apartment because "individuals sexually interested in children frequently utilize child 
pornography to reduce inhibitions of their victims."84 More specifically, the court felt 
that sexual depictions of minors could be logically related to the crime of child 
enticement, particularly when defendant had referred to movies and videos that he 
wanted the child to view at his apartment. 85 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affrrmed the district court's holding that 
notwithstanding the affidavit's lack of detail the reviewing magistrate could have 
reasonably concluded that the search of Colbert's home was justified.86 The majority's 
rationale was that there is an intuitive relationship between acts such as child molestation 
or enticement and possession of child pornography. 87 The circuit court also noted that for 
individuals seeking to obtain sexual gratification by abusing children, possession of child 
pornography may very well be a logical precursor to physical interaction with a child: the 
relative ease with which child pornography may be obtained on the internet make it a 
simpler and less detectable way of satisfying pedophiliac desires. 88 
Judge John Gibson dissented and was wary of the majority's opinion, stating, 
"The majority relies upon a dangerous assumption in reaching its conclusion that the 
83 I d. at 576-77. 
84 ld. at 577. 
85 ld. 
86Jd. 
87 Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578. 
88 Jd. 
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affidavit satisfies the requirements of the Fourth Amendment."89 Judge Gibson asserted 
that, at best, the affidavit established probable cause to believe that Colbert was involved 
in the crime of child enticement.90 The dissent also noted that even if a relationship did 
exist between child enticement and child pornography, "it was unreasonable for the 
magistrate judge ... to infer such a nexus without further evidence to support that 
inference."91 The dissent heavily relied on two cases, United States v. Hodson92 and 
United States v. Falso. 93 
2. United States v. Hodson- 6th Circuit 
On October 7, 2005, Detective Juan Passano of the Passaic County, New Jersey 
Sheriffs Department Internet Crimes Section, in his search for online sexual predators, 
logged onto America Online ("AOL") as "kidlatino12" and represented himself as a 
twelve year-old boy .94 Once online, he encountered a user by the name 
"WhopperDaddy" and conversed with him for one hour.95 During the conversation, 
"Whopper Daddy" confided that he was a forty-one year-old married man with two 
sons.96 He also shared that he was a homosexual who favored young boys, that he liked 
looking at his nine and eleven year-old sons naked, and that he even had sex with his 
seven year-old nephew.97 Detective Passano subpoenaed AOL for information, which 
89 Jd at 579. 
90 Jd at 580. 
91 ld at 580-81. 
92 United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008). 
93 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2008). 
94 I d. at 287. 
95ld 
96ld 
97ld 
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revealed that Michael Hodson of Middlesboro, Kentucky was registered to that screen 
name.
98 
Three weeks later, Passano contacted Detective Jacqualine Pickrell of the 
Kentucky State Police Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force to inquire about 
Hodson.99 Pickrell verified the information she received from Passano, but discovered 
that he had only one son and no known nephews.100 Pickrell subsequently prepared an 
affidavit, based entirely on the AOL information and the Internet conversation between 
Hodson and Passano, and petitioned a magistrate judge for a warrant to search Hodson's 
residence.101 The affidavit's depiction of the places to be searched and the things to be 
seized described and directed a search for evidence of child pornography, not child 
molestation.102 The statement of probable cause in the affidavit did not contain 
information with regard to Hodson engaging in any aspect of child pornography or any 
basis for believing that individuals who engage in child molestation are likely to also 
possess child pornography.103 Nonetheless, the magistrate judge issued the warrant and a 
search was performed on Hodson's residence.104 Buried in the hard drives of Hodson's 
computers, the police located between ten and fifty pictures of child pornography. No 
evidence was seized or subsequently discovered that would support any charge against 
Hodson of child rnolestation. 105 
98ld 
99 Hodson, 543 F.3d at 287. 
100 Jd 
101Jd. 
102 Jd. at 288-89. 
103 ld. at 289. 
104Jd 
105 Hodson, 543 F.3d at 289. 
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Hodson was indicted on charges of receiving and possessing child 
pornography.106 Hodson moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search.107 
The motion was submitted to a magistrate judge, who stated: 
At best, the evidence in the Affidavit connecting Hodson to 
child pornography is limited and indirect. There is a weak 
inference that Hodson indulges in child pornography 
because its visual quality is consistent with Hodson's 
interest in simply seeing his children unclothed. Any 
additional link between Hodson and child pornography, 
however, would require an assumption, by the issuing 
judicial officer, that a person suspected of child molestation 
or an illicit online chat involving a child also possesses 
child pornography .108 
The magistrate declined to make that assumption. The judge was not convinced 
that, standing alone, evidence of child molestation demonstrated probable cause to 
believe that Hodson possessed child pornography .1 09 In reaching this conclusion, the 
magistrate judge noted: 
Certainly, a reviewing magistrate judge may make 
reasonable inferences based on common sense. But, as 
loathsome as Hodson's chat content was, the magistrate 
judge is not equipped to supply an empirical link between 
sexual deviance, or even sexual attraction, and pornography 
possession. Such a link depends on expertise ... to support 
the warrant application.110 
Having decided that the affidavit did not establish probable cause, the reviewing 
magistrate proceeded to the second argument, namely whether the officer's reliance on 
the search warrant was made in good faith. 111 The reviewing magistrate judge accepted 
the government's argument, finding that Detective Pickrell's "failure to include her 
106Jd 
107Jd. 
108 ld. at 290. 
109Jd 
110 Jd at 291 (internal alterations omitted). 
111 Hodson, 543 F.3d at 291. 
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opinion as the critical link to establish probable cause does not reduce the affidavit to 
mere suspicion or belief because "[t]hese suspected crimes are not as 'unrelated' to child 
pornography as [Hodson] contends; both the cited conduct and the sought evidence 
. 1 al 1 . . f . " 112 1nvo ve sexu exp o1tat1on o m1nors. 
Both parties submitted objections to the magistrate's fmdings and the district 
court conducted a hearing.113 The district court deemed the warrant defective for its lack 
of probable cause, fmding that Pickrell had failed to offer the expertise necessary to 
establish a "link between sexual deviance ... and pornography possession."114 
Additionally, the district court applied the Leon good faith exception, concluding, among 
other things, that "the affidavit contains information demonstrating that, at the very least, 
[Hodson] was engaged in child molestation and illicit online activity. These activities are 
related to the possession of child pornography in that both involve sexual exploitation of 
minors."115 The district court denied Hodson's motion to suppress the evidence and 
sentenced Hodson to seventy-one months in prison. 116 Hodson appealed the denial of his 
motion to suppress.117 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of the 
motion to suppress, vacated Hodson's conviction, and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.118 In so doing, the court of appeals held that: 
112 ld. 
ll3ld 
ll4Jd 
115 ld. at 292. 
It was unreasonable for the magistrate judge in this case, 
when confronted with the request for the warrant, to infer 
such a nexus without further evidence to support that 
inference. It is similarly unreasonable for the officer 
116 United States v. Hodson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93490 (E.D. Ky., Dec. 27, 2006). 
117Jd 
118 Hodson, 543 F.3d at 293. 
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In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals relied on dicta in another Sixth 
Circuit case, United States v. Adkins. 120 Adkins held that, "standing alone, a high 
incidence of child molestation by persons convicted of child pornography crimes may not 
demonstrate that a child molester is likely to possess child pornography ."121 
3. United States v. Falso- Second Circuit 
United States v. Falso is yet another circuit court case that further blurs the 
probable cause standard in relation to child molestation and child pornography. 122 The 
lower court denied Falso's motion to suppress evidence seized from his home on the 
grounds that probable cause for the search did not exist. 123 The issue presented on appeal 
to the Second Circuit was 
119 ld. 
Whether a substantial basis for the district court's finding 
of probable cause exists where the law enforcement 
affidavit supporting the search warrant alleged that Falso 
appears to have gained or attempted to gain access to a 
website that distributed child pornography and had been 
convicted eighteen years earlier of a misdemeanor based on 
sexual abuse of a minor .124 
120 United States v. Adkins, 169 F.App'x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006). 
121 Jd (citing United States v. Adkins, 169 F.App'x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006) e'Standing alone, a high 
instance of child molestation by persons convicted of child pornography crimes may not demonstrate that a 
child molester is likely to possess child pornography. But, the affidavit set forth other information on the 
likelihood of a molester's possessing pornography, namely the FBI's "institutional knowledge[.]" This 
"institutional knowledge" included the information that preferential offenders devote time, money, and 
energy to the pursuit of child pornography or sexual contact with children; that they typically keep 
collections of child pornography or "child erotica"; and that they have well-developed techniques for 
gaining access to child pornography or child victims. This information, in conjunction with Agent Vito's 
determination that Mr. Adkins is a preferential offender, supports a finding that Adkins was reasonably 
likely to possess child pornography.")). 
122 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2008). 
123 Id. at 112. 
I24Jd. 
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More specifically, because the court found that Falso was not alleged to be a 
member of the child pornography website, but rather only that he attempted to gain 
access to the site, the question on appeal hinged on whether Falso's eighteen-year old 
conviction involving the sexual abuse of a minor provided a sufficient basis to believe 
that evidence of child pornography crimes would be found in his home.125 The majority 
opinion held that probable cause was lacking.126 
In evaluating whether probable cause existed in the affidavit in this case, the court 
first looked to the illustrated nexus between child pornography and child molestation. 127 
While the affidavit in this case represented that "the majority of individuals who collect 
child pornography are persons who have a sexual attraction to children" the Second 
Circuit stated that this reasoning fell victim to logic.128 The court relied on Judge 
Pooler's dissenting opinion in United States v. Martin129 that "it is an inferential fallacy 
of ancient standing to conclude that, because members of group A" (those who collect 
child pornography) "are likely to be members of group B" (those attracted to children), 
"then group B is entirely, or even largely composed of, members of group A."130 Thus, 
the court concluded that "while the district court undoubtedly had the safety of the public 
in mind, an individual's Fourth Amendment right cannot be vitiated based on fallacious 
inferences drawn from facts not supported by the affidavit."131 
125 Jd. at 113-14. 
126 ld. at 114. 
127 Falso, 544 F.3d at 114 
128 ld. at 122. 
129 United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 82 (2d. Cir. 2005). 
13
° Falso, 544 F.3d at 122 (quoting Martin, 426 F.3d at 82 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (In Martin, Judge Pooler 
criticized the majority's inference that because collectors of child pornography are likely to be subscribers 
of e-groups, that the inverse also is true: namely, that subscribers are likely to collect child pornography.). 
131Jd. 
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The court then discussed whether Falso's prior sex-crime conviction was 
relevant to the probable cause analysis.132 The court determined that no such evidence of 
ongoing impropriety existed in this case to bridge the temporal gap between Falso's 
eighteen-year old sex offense and the suspected child pornography offense. 133 Further, 
the court stated that although Falso' s prior conviction involved the sexual abuse of a 
minor, it did not relate to child pomography.134 It is not enough that the law criminalizes 
both of the aforementioned crimes; they are separate offenses and nothing in the affidavit 
in Falso drew the necessary correlation between a person's propensities to commit both 
types of crimes. 135 The Second Circuit found no substantial basis for probable cause. 136 
IV .. 
Potential Solution 
Expanded Probable Cause Standard Limited to Child Exploitation Situations 
In order to resolve the murky waters of this issue, the Supreme Court should 
develop an expanded probable cause standard limited to child exploitation situations 
when certain r~quirements are met. This type of expansion would not be earth shattering, 
132 ld. 
133 Jd. at 123. 
134ld. 
135 Falso, 544 F.3d at 123 . . But see United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179 (Second Circuit affirmed District 
Court's evidentiary ruling permitting the government, in its prosecution of a defendant for traveling in 
interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual contact with a minor, to present the jury 
with images of child pornography found on the defendant's computer. The court explained that the 
defendant's collection of child pornography indicated an "abnormal sexual attraction to children," and thus 
was relevant to the offense for which the defendant stood trial, which involved the same abnormalcy. The 
court then went on to say that a direct connection exists between child pornography and pedophilia. The 
Second Circuit partially drew their conclusion from congressional testimony of the FBI, which noted "a 
strong correlation between child pornography offenders and molesters of children and that the correlation 
between collection of child pornography and actual child abuse is too real and too grave to ignore. I d. at 
198 n. 17 (quoting Enhancing Child Protection Laws After the Apri/16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision, 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 07th Cong. (2002) (statement by Michael J. Heinbach, Crimes 
Against Children Unit, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI)). 
136 Jd. at 124. 
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as it is already used consistently and analogously in cases where law enforcement seeks 
to find evidence in the home of an individual suspected of association with drugs. 137 
Likewise, because of the severity of crimes dealing with child endangerment, an 
expanded probable cause standard allowing evidence of certain child exploitation crimes 
to support probable cause for a search for child pornography is warranted by societal 
norms. 
A. Existing Judicial Precedent of Probable Cause Standard as a Foundation 
This new standard should not be analyzed in a vacuum and reviewing magistrates 
should continue to take into account judicial precedent on ascertaining whether the 
probable cause standard has been met. One important aspect that cannot be overlooked is 
the notion developed in Johnson v. United States, 138 requiring a neutral and detached 
magistrate to draw the usual inferences that a reasonable man could draw from the 
evidence provided. This does not deny law enforcement the support of reasonable 
inferences; it simply places that control in the hands of the magistrate as opposed to the 
potentially zealous police officer engaged in the often-competitive enterprise of ferretting 
out crime.139 
Additionally, magistrates should continue to abide by the 'totality of the 
circumstances' approach used in Gates to determine when probable cause exists. 140 By 
rejecting the rigid Aguilar-Spinelli141 two-pronged test, the Supreme Court in Gates 
137 See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
138 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367,392, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). 
139 Id. 
140 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317,76 L.Ed. 2d 527 (1983). 
141 Aguilar v. State of Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964) abrogated by Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 
89 S. Ct. 584,21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969) abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. 
Ed. 2d 527 (1983). 
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adopted an all-encompassing "totality of the circumstances" standard. 142 The standard 
states that the issuing magistrate's task is "simply to make a practical, common-sense 
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is 
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place."143 The Supreme Court hoped that this flexible, easily applied standard would 
better achieve the equilibrium of public and private interests that the Fourth Amendment 
requires. 144 
B. Analogous Situations of an Expansion of the Probable Cause Standard 
There are many examples of situations in which courts have allowed a loose 
interpretation of the probable cause standard in evaluating affidavits related to drug 
activity.145 For example, the search warrant affidavit in United States v. Pace included 
the police officer's contention that drug dealers normally keep records at their homes. 146 
Pace dealt with a situation where police officers obtained a search warrant for a bam 
located on defendant's property that officers had knowledge was being used to grow and 
store marijuana.147 On the basis of the information obtained from the search of the bam, 
warrants were issued for Pace's residence.148 During the subsequent search of Pace's 
residence, officers seized a triple beam balance scale, a small quantity of marijuana, and 
various business and phone records. 149 
142 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
143 Jd. 
144
Jd at 239. 
145 See infra note 161. 
146United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270,276 (5th Cir. 1992). 
147 ld at 272. 
148Jd 
I49Jd 
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The court discussed the application of the holding of United States v. Freeman150, 
which stated that "facts must exist in the affidavit which establish a nexus between the 
house to be searched and the evidence sought."151 The affidavit must connect the 
residence to be searched with the illegal activity, but this nexus may be established 
"through normal inferences as to where the articles sought would be located."152 In Pace, 
the court posited that the affidavit described a sufficient connection between the illegal 
activity at the barn and the expectation of what would be found at Pace's residence to 
give rise to probable cause to search Pace's home.153 This case clearly illustrates the 
importance of the affiant expressly explaining the connection between drug trafficking 
and the drug records that drug dealers often keep in their residences. In essence the 
affiant must clearly delineate the nexus between specific criminal activity and the 
particular location to be searched. 
United States v. Feliz presents a similar analogous situation in which the probable 
cause standard was expanded to fmd a sufficient nexus between the probable criminal 
activity described in the search warrant and the evidence to be found at the particular 
location. 154 In Feliz, officers submitted an affidavit containing substantial, detailed 
information indicating that the defendant, Feliz, had engaged in illegal drug trafficking. 155 
Feliz argued that none of the drug sales occurred at or near his apartment, and that the 
law enforcement agent's experience in drug trafficking cases and his opinions regarding 
150 United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1982). 
151 Jd. at 276 (citing United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
152 I d. at 277. 
153 Pace, 955 F.2d at 277. 
154 United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 88 (1st Cir. 1999). 
155 ld. at 86. 
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the habits of drug traffickers with regard to retention of drug trafficking records and 
proceeds are inadequate to supply the required nexus. 156 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with this contention.157 The court 
stated that interpreting a search warrant affidavit in the proper "commonsense and 
realistic fashion" may result in the inference of probable cause to believe that criminal 
objects are located in a particular place, such as a suspect's residence, to which they have 
not been tied by direct evidence.158 The most analogous reasoning in Feliz came from a 
previous First Circuit case, United States v. Charest, which held that: 
The nexus between the objects to be seized and the 
premises searched need not, and often will not, rest on 
direct observation, but rather "can be inferred from the type 
of crime, the nature of the items sought, the extent of an 
opportunity for concealment and normal inferences as to 
where a criminal would hide [evidence of a crime]."159 
Ultimately, the Feliz court held that it was not unreasonable for the issuing judge 
to have relied upon her common sense, buttressed by the affiant's opinion as a law 
enforcement officer, that Feliz would likely have proceeds and records from his drug 
trafficking transactions at his apartment. 160 
The preceding cases demonstrate that courts have loosely interpreted the probable 
cause standard in certain situations relating to drug trafficking crimes. The magistrates 
issued warrants to locate evidence of a crime without any direct proof that the evidence 
would be located in the defendants' homes. Subjective testimony from law enforcement 
officials based on their experience and training, as well as, common sense inferences 
156 ld. at 87. 
157 ld. 
158 ld. at 88. 
159 Jd. (citing United States v. Charest, 602 F.2d 1015, 1017 (1st Cir. 1979)). 
16° Feliz, 182 F.3d at 88. 
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made by the neutral and detached magistrates allowed for these search warrants to be 
approved. 161 If the probable cause standard can be broadened to account for these 
specific drug related crimes, this Comment serves to defend the notion that it should be 
broadened for inherently dangerous crimes involving child exploitation. 
C. The Uniqueness of Child Pornography Offenders and Why the Probable 
Cause Standard Should be Broadened in Relation to Child Exploitation 
Crimes 
The effect of sweeping technological advances on modem American society has 
forced the law to adapt. Like all other areas, criminal law is no exception and must adjust 
to keep pace with advancing technology. While the market for child pornography 
unfortunately is not new, the advent of the Internet and increasing sophistication of 
computer technology in general has made child pornography a global industry. 162 
Additionally, the Internet provides sheer anonymity to all users. The success of law 
enforcement officials in tracking and apprehending child pornographers depends on their 
ability to stay up to date with cutting edge technological advances. 163 However, the 
efficacy of law enforcement officials also hinges on the reign given to them by legislative 
and judicial decisions.164 Furthermore, all three branches of government must take great 
efforts to ensure the equilibrium between the sacred individual privacy interests and the 
concern over the dangers surrounding the exploitation of innocent children. 
Typically, defendants who engage in child pornography present a complex and 
unique barrier to law enforcement discovery. Detecting child pornography is difficult 
161 See Pace, 955 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1992); Feliz, 182 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 1999); Freeman, 685 F.2d 942 (5th 
Cir. 1982); Charest, 602 F.2d 1015 (1st Cir. 1979). 
162 Amy E. Wells, Criminal Procedure: The Fourth Amendment Collides with the Problem of Child 
Pornography and the Internet, 53 Okla. L. Rev. 99 (2000). 
163 ld 
164ld 
27 
Katie Rigler 
because those who actively possess and/or distribute the material take great pains to 
conceal their crimes.165 Often time's child pornography is not discovered until after an 
individual has been arrested for a far more serious offense involving a child.166 In this 
same regard, the law has been reactive as opposed to proactive about responding to this 
burgeoning social crisis. 
The judiciary's willingness to adopt a broadened probable cause standard in drug 
related crimes might be a result of the global 'War on Drugs' and law enforcement efforts 
to reduce the illegal drug trade. While nothing in this Comment attempts to lessen the 
severity and importance of reducing or eliminating the illegal drug trade, there is no 
reason why this expanded probable cause standard cannot be extended to crimes 
involving child exploitation. The history outlined in detail in Part II of this Comment 
presents a common theme across all branches of government that crimes that victimize 
children are considered abhorrent and unconscionable acts for the vast majority of 
people. 167 Furthermore, the single most distinctive characteristic of habitual child 
molesters is a compelling interest in collecting child pornography.168 Thus, for many 
child molesters, child pornography serves as a facilitator of this heinous crime.169 
The two competing interests in this debate are the all-American sanctity of the 
individual's privacy in the home versus the overwhelming concern for the exploitation of 
innocent, defenseless children. This is a hard balancing act because of the high value that 
American citizen's place on their individualized privacy interests. The privacy of one's 
home is a sacred interest that United States citizens cherish and value. In weighing these 
165 Law Enforcement Training Network, Sex Crimes, Part 1: Child Pornography, 18 (2009). 
166Jd 
167 See supra Part II. 
168 Jd at 6. 
169ld. 
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two sides carefully, the judiciary's decisions must tip in favor of protecting the innocent 
child. Child pornography presents a severe danger to innocent, defenseless children with 
diminished decision-making capacities. 
This expansion of the probable cause standard cannot be interpreted as providing 
carte blanche freedom to law enforcement officials in obtaining search warrants. But, 
when a search warrant affidavit provides (1) clear history and examples of training and 
experience of the affiant in establishing and determining probable cause; (2) a detailed 
description of reliable statistical data reflecting the strong correlation between specific 
child exploitation crimes; and (3) a delineated nexus between the first two elements and 
the particular place to be searched, in addition to the common sense, practical application 
of the neutral and detached magistrate, probable cause has been established to search for 
child pornography in an individual's home with or without direct evidence. 
D. Practical Ramifications of Implementing a Broadened Probable Cause 
Standard 
Implementing this broadened standard has the potential to create more efficiency 
within the law enforcement arena, as well as provide a more manageable standard to 
combat a highly secretive and extremely dangerous crime. Because of the exceptionally 
high level of danger child molesters and child pornographers pose to our society, this 
expansion is appropriate. 
The courts are not new to altering and expanding the probable cause standard. 
For example, in Terry v. Ohio, the Court denounced the suggestion of a rigid, all-or-
nothing model of justification and regulation under the Fourth Amendment. 170 
170 Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17,88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). 
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Furthermore, the majority opinion in Terry perfectly described the underlying notions of 
the requirement of probable cause in general. 171 In assessing the probable cause standard: 
It is necessary to first focus upon the governmental interest 
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the 
constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen, for 
there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other 
than by balancing the need to search against the invasion 
which the search entails. And in justifying the particular 
intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion.172 
The Court stated that an inflexible approach obscures the utility of limitations 
upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police action as a means of constitutional 
regulation. 173 Terry announced a new standard allowing a reasonable search for weapons 
for the protection of the police officer where he has reason to believe that he is dealing 
with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to 
arrest the individual for a crime.174 As Justice Harlan stated in his concurrence, the 
Majority's opinion would serve as initial guidelines for law enforcement authorities and 
courts throughout the land. 175 This 'stop and frisk' standard allows police officers with 
articulable suspicion, something less than probable cause, to forcibly frisk and disarm 
individuals thought to be carrying weapons. 176 
On the other hand, the potential danger of this broadened approach to the 
determination of probable cause in situations limited to crimes dealing with child 
exploitation could open the floodgates for similar treatment for other types of crimes. 
171 Jd. 
172Jd. 
173 ld. 
174 I d. at 28. 
175 Jd at 31. 
176 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). 
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This type of multifarious balancing of crimes in regards to the weight of societal interests 
could easily result in a weakening of the safeguards envisioned by the framers of the 
Fourth Amendment. This potential danger could also be exacerbated in the event that the 
balancing is done in the frrst instance by well-intentioned, but perhaps over-zealous, 
police officers as opposed to a reviewing magistrate judge. But, if this expanded 
approach to determining probable cause is safeguarded in sync with the Supreme Court's 
consistent refusal to intrude upon constitutionally guaranteed rights then this limited 
expansion for inherently dangerous child exploitation crimes is warranted. 
v. 
Conclusion 
While it remains true that child molestation and child pornography are two 
separate crimes and that the seriousness of one crime should never be primarily based on 
evidence of the other, there is overwhelming evidence that these two types of crimes are 
strongly correlated. One detective in the Los Angeles Police Department estimated that 
of the 700 child molesters arrested over ten years, more than half had child pornography 
in their possession at the time of arrest, and roughly 80% owned either child or adult 
pornography. 177 Additionally, a statement made by then Senator Joe Biden during a 
congressional hearing was captured in a Columbia Law Review article as saying, "At the 
heart of the analysis .. .is a very straightforward idea: Children who are used in the 
production of child pornography are victims of abuse, plain and simple. And the 
pornographers, also plainly and simply, are child abusers. " 178 The growing technology of 
177 Michael Reagan, Child Porn is Child Abuse. I Know Because it Happened to Me, 2010, available at: 
http://www .fo:xnews.com/opinion/20 1 0112/09/michael-reagan-child-pornography-child-abuse-know-
happened/#ixzz 1 Zeyr 1 pEG. 
178 Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 209,273 (2001). 
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the Internet and the ever-increasing ways that child pornography possessors can hide 
images and deceive law enforcement creates an impossibly difficult issue of which 
traditional investigative techniques are no longer useful to prevent the victimization of 
innocent children. 
Thus, while child pornographers do not fit precisely into any existing, traditional 
Fourth Amendment category, a response by the judiciary in formulating a broadened 
probable cause standard in order to search for child pornography is this nation's best 
attempt at combating the societal danger created by this type of crime. The probable 
cause standard is not being broadened to interfere with sexual activity between two 
consenting adults in the privacy of their own home. This Comment concerns a unique 
area of the law where society has already drawn special, protective boundaries in order to 
safeguard innocent child victims. While this modest expansion of the probable cause 
standard may appear contrary to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has 
constantly attempted to strike a balance between compelling government interests and 
individual privacy rights. Inevitably, with every solution there may be a slight invasion 
of privacy; however, in order to combat the inherently dangerous category of crimes 
involving child exploitation, this limited expansion is the fair and just result. By 
emulating the already approved application of the probable cause standard for drug 
related crimes, the judiciary can create an efficient and more uniform conception of 
determining probable cause for crimes relating to child exploitation. 
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